Many recent studies have underlined the fact that, under certain conditions, 3-and 4-year-old children will defer to proposals that run counter to their own ideas and observations. In opening a box, they set aside their own efficient procedure to reproduce a more elaborate and inefficient technique that has been demonstrated to them (Horner and Whiten 2005 ; Lyons et al. 2007 Lyons et al. , 2011 Nielsen and Tomaselli 2010 ) . Asked to say what category an object belongs to and infer its properties, they revise their initial, appearance-based categorization when an adult proposes an alternative that is less consistent with the available perceptual evidence (Jaswal 2004 ) . When told about the movement and final resting-place of an object falling down an opaque tube, they are prepared to set aside their otherwise robust, gravity-based expectations to search where told (Bascandziev and Harris 2010 ; Jaswal 2010 ). Indeed, even when confronted with repeated evidence that what they have been told is false, preschoolers continue to act on that information, for example, by following an adult's misleading indication of the location of a hidden object (Couillard and Woodward 1999 ; Jaswal et al. 2010 ) . These deferential reactions lend support to the long-standing assumption that young children are credulous -disposed to trust claims made by other people even when those claims run counter to their own convictions or intuitions.
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Contrary to this assumption, we argue that children are not prone to indiscriminate credulity. Instead, they engage in what we will refer to as selective trust. As just documented, young children do accept information from others, even when it runs counter to their own observations and intuitions. Nevertheless, when they meet informants who make conflicting claims they do not endorse both claims. They typically endorse those made by one informant rather than the other. In particular, they use two guiding principles or heuristics. They are inclined to accept the claims of informants with whom they have a social connection over those made by strangers. Second, they are inclined to accept the claims of informants who have proven well-informed rather than ill-informed. We describe the evidence for these two heuristics and then ask what children do when the two heuristics are placed in opposition. Whom do young children endorse if a relative stranger appears to be better informed than someone they know well?
Having reviewed the available findings, we consider their implications for children's metacognitive abilities. More specifically, we weigh up two possible interpretations. One possibility is that when children select among informants, such selectivity necessarily implies a capacity for metacognition, however limited or basic. A second possible interpretation is that children might initially select among informants, irrespective of any metacognitive capacity that they possess. On this argument, it is only when children begin to select among informants in terms of how well informed those informants are that it is legitimate to speak in terms of metacognition. 1 The Strange Situation consists of a series of episodes in the course of which infants are briefly separated from their mother and eventually reunited. The infants' behaviour is coded to assess how they cope with the separation and how readily they are reassured when the mother returns. A large body of findings suggests that children show a relatively stable set of reactions toward a given caregiver both during and after the separation, reactions that reflect expectations that infants build up about how reliable the caregiver is as a source of comfort and reassurance. 1 assessed using a procedure similar to the one just described for the two daycare centres. Children were invited to ask for and accept information about the names or functions of unfamiliar objects from either their mother or from a relatively unfamiliar stranger. Fig. 12 . 3 shows the proportion of choices that children in each of the three attachment groups directed at their mother as compared to the stranger. Inspection of Fig. 12. 3 shows that, overall, we replicated the pattern found in the earlier study. Children preferred to trust the information supplied by a familiar informant -their mother -as compared to that supplied by a stranger. Nevertheless, Fig. 12 . 3 also shows that the strength of that preference varied across the three attachment groups. It was an unreliable trend among children with an avoidant relationship. On the other hand, it was a systematic preference among children with a secure or ambivalent relationship. Apparently, children's trust in an informant, including a highly familiar informant such as their mother, is moderated by their history of interaction with her. It is too early to say what particular aspects of that interaction are critical. Still, in line with the classic tenets of attachment theory, it is plausible that mothers vary in their responsiveness and children come to notice and encode that variation and respond accordingly. For example, based on past experience, avoidant children might have come to the conclusion that their mothers are relatively unresponsive as informants. As a result, avoidant children show no particular preference for the information that she can supply as compared to that of a stranger. Secure children might be confident about their mother's responsiveness and systematic in seeking and accepting the information that she provides. Ambivalent children might be especially, indeed uncritically dependent on the information supplied by their mother, especially in comparison to that supplied by a stranger.
One other, related point is worth emphasizing. Evidently, mere familiarity with an informant is no guarantee that the information she supplies will be preferred. It is tempting to draw that conclusion from the study with children's caregivers in daycare (Figs 12. 1 and 12. 2 ) but the findings for the avoidant children ( Fig. 12. 3 ) show that such a conclusion would be mistaken. Even though avoidant children were obviously familiar with their mother, they did not prefer the information she supplied to that of a stranger. By implication, when children build up trust in a caregiver over repeated encounters, they are not just accumulating feelings of familiarity -they are also building up a social or emotional connection.
Approximately 12 months later, when the children were 5 years of age, we again tested their reactions to their mother as compared to a stranger. The children were presented with pictures of animal hybrids that were of two different types. One type consisted of symmetric hybrids: each hybrid resembled two different animals -such as a cow and a horse -to the same degree. We anticipated that when children heard their mother categorize the hybrid in one way -'That's a horse' -and the stranger categorize it in another way -'That's a cow' -they would respond as they had done with the novel, hardware objects. Even if, objectively speaking, each categorization 1 was equally consistent with the available perceptual evidence, we expected children to favour the categorization supplied by their mother. We also expected the strength of that preference to vary depending on the nature of children's attachment to their mother. Inspection of Fig. 12 . 4 shows that both of these expectations were borne out. Overall, children preferred to seek and accept information from their mother rather than from the stranger. Nevertheless, the strength of that preference varied with the child's attachment status. It was absent among avoidant children, systematic among secure children, and very strong among ambivalent children. These results were encouraging. They confirmed the pattern that we had observed initially, showing that it was robust even though children were almost 1 year older, thereby further extending the time that had elapsed between children's assessment in the Strange Situation and our test of selective trust.
The second set of hybrids was asymmetric: they resembled two different animals to different degrees. For example, for 75 % of its perceptual features an asymmetric hybrid might resemble a squirrel but for the remaining 25 % of its features it might resemble a rabbit. The mother always named the animal in terms of the less plausible category (e.g. 'That's a rabbit') whereas the stranger named the animal in terms of the more plausible category (e.g. 'That's a squirrel'). We anticipated two different possible outcomes. First, suppose that children did not encode the balance of the perceptual evidence. For example, they might simply note the resemblance to both a rabbit and a squirrel but fail to notice that overall the evidence pointed to its being a squirrel rather than a rabbit. If that were the case, the pattern of results should be the same as displayed in Figs 12. 3 and 12. 4 . Alternatively, suppose that children did notice the asymmetry and left to their own judgement would be more likely to categorize the hybrid as a squirrel than a rabbit. To the extent that children weigh that perceptually plausible categorization against the alternative categorization proposed by their mother, we might expect them to display less confidence in the claim made by their mother. Moreover, to the extent that all children, no matter what their attachment status, are likely to have similar perceptual intuitions about the hybrid, we might reasonably expect that reduction in confidence to be roughly comparable across all three attachment groups.
Inspection of Fig. 12 . 5 shows that the pattern of results fits the second proposal not the first. Children do seem to notice that they are dealing with asymmetric rather than symmetric hybrids. This perceptual intuition undermines confidence in their mother's claims and this reduction is of approximately the same magnitude for all three attachment groups: compare Figs 12. 4 and 12. 5 . More broadly, the different pattern of findings obtained with the asymmetric as compared to the symmetric hybrids implies that children's reactions to the claims made by others depend on their own convictions about what they see. When they are uncertain -as they presumably were in the case of the symmetric 50/50 hybrids -they readily yield to a trusted informant such as their mother. On the other hand, when provided with more counter evidence-as with the asymmetric 75/25 hybrids, they are less likely to defer to an ordinarily trusted informant. One final result is worth putting in context. In a series of experiments, Vikram Jaswal has also assessed the extent to which children defer to an informant when categorizing objects. He reports that when presented with asymmetric hybrids (for example, the rabbit-squirrel), and told by a single adult informant that the hybrid belongs to the less likely category, children are inclined to defer to the adult. Indeed, they defer despite the fact that, when left to their own devices, they categorize the hybrid in terms of the more likely category. This deference is less evident among 4-year-olds than 3-year-olds but even 4-year-olds readily defer if the adult signals that what he or she is claiming might seem unlikely ('You're not going to believe this but … ') (Jaswal 2004 ). Based on these findings, we might have expected that most children would defer to their mother's claims even when presented with asymmetric hybrids. Indeed, to the extent that Jaswal found that most children deferred to an unfamiliar adult who identified the hybrid as belonging to the less likely category, we might have expected children in our study to defer even more to their own mother who also identified the hybrid as belonging to the less likely category.
The children in our study were somewhat older than those tested by Jaswal ( 2004 ) . As children get older, they might be increasingly sceptical of counterintuitive claims, even those made by a trusted informant such as their mother. In addition, however, a procedural change may have played an important role. In the studies conducted by Jaswal ( 2004 ) , children heard the unexpected categorization proposed by a single, unfamiliar adult. By contrast, in the study that we conducted, children heard two informants propose conflicting categorizations -their mother proposed a less plausible categorization but a stranger proposed a more plausible categorization. Arguably, the children in our study did not simply weigh their own perceptual judgement against the proposal made by their mother, they were also bolstered in making their own judgement by the fact that it coincided with that of the stranger. In short, children are more confident of their own perception-based conviction if another person -even a stranger -agrees with them. Indeed, we might reasonably speculate that had their mother's proposal coincided with their perceptionbased conviction whereas the stranger presented children with a less plausible categorization, children would have displayed a very strong preference for the more plausible categorization.
These findings underline the claim that in assessing children's credulity, we should not simply try to find out how far they defer to the judgement of another person. We need to ask how they select among the conflicting claims of various informants. In the next section, we look at the question of whether preschoolers select among informants on epistemic as opposed to socioemotional grounds. 
Trusting knowledgeable informants
To examine this dimension of children's selective trust, we have adopted the following basic paradigm. First, children are given information about the differential knowledge or reliability of two informants in a familiarization period. Then, in a test period, an unfamiliar object is presented and children are given an opportunity to seek and accept information about it from one or other of the two informants. We measure the extent to which children choose to rely on the more knowledgeable of the two informants. In one series of experiments, we assessed children's ability to distinguish between a knowledgeable and an ignorant informant. In the familiarization period, children were introduced to two informants -one named each of three common objects accurately whereas the other admitted to not knowing their names (Koenig and Harris, 2005 , experiment 2) . Because the objects were familiar, the children could confirm for themselves that one informant knew the right names for the objects even if the other claimed ignorance. Before and after the ensuing test period, children were asked to make an explicit judgement about the relative knowledge of the two informants. More specifically, they were asked to judge who was 'not very good at answering the questions' about the names of the objects. In the test period, children were first shown another familiar object and asked to predict what the two informants would say about it. They were then shown three novel objects whose names they did not know, invited to ask one of the informants what each novel object was called, and after each had suggested a different name for the novel object, to endorse one of the two supplied names. Overall, both age groups proved to be remarkably good at judging, predicting and utilizing the difference between the two informants (see Fig. 12 . 6 ). Thus, in answering the explicit judgement questions, children reliably picked out the informant who was 'not very good' at answering the questions. In the prediction trials, they anticipated that one informant would name the object accurately whereas the other would acknowledge ignorance or make a mistake. When given an opportunity to ask for information, they preferred to ask the knowledgeable as opposed to the ignorant informant. Finally, when given an opportunity to endorse the name supplied by one informant or the other, they tended to endorse the name supplied by the knowledgeable informant -although this selective pattern of endorsement was weaker among 3-year-olds as compared to 4-year-olds. Is children's selective trust confined to object naming -the domain in which the two informants had displayed differential knowledge? Alternatively, do they also display selective trust if the two informants offer information about a different domain -for example, object functions -as Children were again introduced to two informants, one who proved accurate and one who proved ignorant in naming familiar objects. They were then shown four unfamiliar objects. For two of the four objects, children were invited to seek help concerning their names. For the other two objects, they were invited to seek help concerning their functions. Fig. 12 . 7 displays the findings for 3-and 4-year-olds. In the explicit judgement trials, children in both age groups were again very accurate in picking out the person who was 'not very good' at answering the questions. Moreover, as before, when the informants proposed conflicting names children typically endorsed the name offered by the knowledgeable informant. Children also displayed a very similar pattern with respect to object functions -they preferred to ask for help from and endorse the function modelled by the more knowledgeable informant.
By implication, having learned about the accuracy with which the knowledgeable informant could name objects, children did not make a very narrow assessment of her knowledge. They also took her to be knowledgeable about object functions. In due course, we will revisit the question of how broad or narrow children's attributions are.
Selective trust might be quite easy for young children to display when they are confronted by an ignorant as compared to a knowledgeable informant -especially when one informant explicitly admits ignorance. How do they react when the two informants vary in a less explicit fashion? To explore this issue, we introduced children to one informant who was accurate and another who was inaccurate in stating the name or the properties of familiar objects. In the subsequent test phase, the two informants supplied information about the names or properties of unfamiliar objects. In these initial experiments, the typical pattern was for 4-year-olds to display selective trust by asking for and endorsing information from the accurate informant whereas 3-year-olds were less systematic Koenig and Harris 2005 ) .
Subsequently, we made various procedural changes designed to facilitate children's recognition and retention of the fact that one informant was accurate whereas the other was inaccurate. The number of familiarization trials was increased from three to four -with the accurate informant naming all four objects correctly and the inaccurate informant naming all four objects incorrectly. The two informants were made more distinctive from one another in terms of clothing. Finally, they remained seated in the same place throughout the familiarization and the test period to facilitate children's ability to re-identify each informant from one phase of the experiment to the next (Pasquini et al. 2007 ). These modifications proved helpful. As Fig. 12 . 8 shows, although 3-year-olds continued to perform less accurately than 4-year-olds, both age-groups performed above chance on three types of probe: they explicitly judged the inaccurate informant to be 'not very good' at answering questions during the familiarization period; they asked for help from the accurate as opposed to the inaccurate informant; and they endorsed the information that she supplied.
Children were also assessed for their ability to solve a standard false belief task involving a misleading container. Overall, they performed quite poorly: 3-year-olds performed below chance whereas 4-year-olds were more mixed with some performing correctly and others not, so that group performance was at chance. However, as just noted, this did not prevent either group from displaying selective trust in the more accurate informant. A clear implication of this conjunction of findings is that correct performance on a standard false belief task is not a prerequisite for selective trust in a more accurate informant.
Summing up the findings so far, preschoolers are quite sensitive to variation between informants in their knowledge. If one informant is consistently knowledgeable or accurate whereas the other is either consistently ignorant or inaccurate, they display selective trust. They appropriately judge the reliable informant to be better at answering questions; they anticipate how each informant will describe an unfamiliar object; they seek information from the more reliable informant; and they selectively endorse the information that they receive from that informant.
In the experiments described so far, each of the two informants behaved in a consistent fashion. One was consistently reliable whereas the other was consistently unreliable. Outside of the laboratory, however, informants are rarely so consistent. They are likely to display a mix of accuracy and inaccuracy, or truth and error. Despite this mix, we nonetheless judge some informants to be generally reliable whereas we are dubious about others. By implication, we form a global impression of someone's trustworthiness -weighing their overall accuracy against their occasional inaccuracy. Do preschoolers display a similar tendency? More specifically, when faced with informants who are less than fully consistent, do they form a global impression of their trustworthiness? To examine this issue, we included two further conditions in the experiment just described. Recall that in one condition children were introduced to one informant who was accurate across all four trials and one informant who was inaccurate across all four trials. We may refer to this as the '100 % vs. 0 % ' condition. In two further conditions, the accurate and/or the inaccurate informant were not fully consistent. In one condition ('75 % vs. 0 % ') one informant was accurate on three of the four trials and the other was consistently inaccurate. In a second condition ('100 % vs. 25 % '), one informant was consistently accurate whereas the other was inaccurate on three of the four trials. In the two new conditions, 4-year-olds were systematic across all three types of test question. They picked out the person who was 'not very good' at answering the questions; they sought help from the other informant; and when given suggestions by both informants, they typically endorsed the more accurate informant. These results show that 4-year-olds 'forgive' occasional errors. Even though the more accurate informant was not consistently accurate in the 75 % vs. 0 % condition, 4-year-olds appeared to overlook that error and treat her as the more trustworthy informant. Conversely, even though the less accurate informant was not consistently inaccurate in the 100 % vs. 25 % condition, 4-year-olds still treated her as the less trustworthy informant. Stated simply, 4-year-olds appear to recognize and accept that informants will display occasional inconsistencythey will sometimes be accurate and sometimes inaccurate -but they prefer those who, on balance, are more rather than less accurate.
The results for the 3-year-olds were less simple but provocative. First, in the 100 % vs. 25 % condition, although they were somewhat less accurate than 4-year-olds, they too were systematic in their answers to all three types of questions. On the other hand, in the 75 % vs. 0 % condition, they behaved in an essentially random fashion across all three test questions. Note that the more accurate informant in this condition made only a single error. By implication, 3-year-olds are 'unforgiving'. They treat an informant making a single error as no more trustworthy than someone making multiple errors.
Further evidence for the different stance of 3-and 4-year-olds emerged in a follow-up experiment. We compared children's performance in two conditions: 75 % vs. 0 % and 75 % vs. 25 % (Pasquini et al. 2007 , experiment 2). If 4-year-olds can monitor the overall balance of accuracy versus inaccuracy, they should display selective trust in both conditions but if 3-year-olds are unforgiving of single errors, they should fail to display selective trust in either. The results fit these expectations. Overall, 4-year-olds displayed selectivity in both conditions but 3-year-olds did so in neither. Fig. 12. 9 shows the results (collapsed across judgement, ask and endorse trials) for the three conditions of the initial study (100 % vs. 0 % ; 100 % vs. 25 % ; 75 % vs. 0 % ) and the two conditions of the follow-up study (75 % vs. 0 % ; 75 % vs. 25 % ). Inspection of Fig. 12 . 9 confirms that 4-year-olds performed above chance in all five conditions whereas 3-year-olds performed above chance in only two conditions -those in which one informant was 100 % accurate.
In all the experiments described so far, one informant proved to be relatively well-informed and the other ill-informed. In principle, therefore, children might not have reduced trust in the ill-informed speaker. They might have increased trust in the well-informed speaker. To examine ) tested 3-and 4-year-olds in three conditions. The accurate-inaccurate condition was similar to the 100 % vs. 0 % condition just described. In the familiarization period, one of the informants consistently named familiar objects accurately whereas the other informant consistently named them inaccurately. In the accurate-neutral condition, one of the informants consistently named familiar objects accurately whereas the other made only neutral or non-committal remarks -'Oh, look at that'. Finally, in the inaccurateneutral condition, one of the informants consistently named familiar objects inaccurately whereas the other made only neutral or non-committal remarks -'Oh, look at that'. Both 3-and 4-year-olds preferred the accurate informant in the accurate-inaccurate condition, consistent with earlier findings. In addition, both age groups preferred the neutral informant in the inaccurate-neutral condition suggesting that when one of two speakers makes mistakes that is sufficient to elicit mistrust. A clear age change emerged in accurate-neutral condition. Fouryear-olds preferred the accurate informant whereas 3-year-olds were not selective.
These data suggest that 4-year-olds keep a fairly precise and comprehensive record of their informants, building up trust in those who have proven accurate and mistrust in those who have proven inaccurate. Three-year-olds, by contrast, appear to focus in a narrower fashion on inaccuracy. If an informant makes a mistake -even a single mistake -they become mistrustful. If both informants make mistakes even with differential frequency, or if one informant is accurate and the other non-committal, they invest no more trust in the one than the other. By implication, 3-year-olds are solely on the look out for mistakes. Whether confronted by a single mistake or by several, their reservoir of trust in that person is depleted.
A plausible underpinning for this particular developmental change is the improvement in children's understanding of false belief that is widely observed between 3 and 5 years (Wellman et al. 2001 ) . From that perspective, younger children think of the mind as a passive recorder or copier of events (Chandler 1988 ; Taylor et al. 1991 ) . So, for 3-year-olds a source is trustworthy when he or she has been 'in contact' with the relevant information. By contrast, older children possess an interpretative theory of mind in which representations may be detached from, or even inconsistent with, their referent, so that the source may be more or less correct. According to this interpretation, children who grasp the potential for false beliefs -typically children aged 4 years and upward -not only withdraw credit in the case of false statements they also tender credit in the case of true statements. By contrast, 3-year-olds typically fail to grasp the potential for false beliefs. Hence, although they withdraw credit in the case of false statements they take true statements for granted. So, extending the argument made earlier: an understanding of false beliefs is not a precondition for mistrusting an inaccurate speaker. As noted earlier, children who fail standard false belief tasks, including 3-year-olds, are able to do that. On the other hand, an understanding of false beliefs may well be a precondition for the augmentation of trust in an accurate speaker.
Weighing socioemotional and epistemic signs of trustworthiness
So far, we have identified two quite different strategies that 3-and 4-year-olds use to select among their informants. First, they use a relational strategy. They prefer to gather and receive information from an informant with whom they have an established relationship -at least, provided it is not avoidant. Second, they use a more epistemic strategy. They prefer to gather and receive information from someone who has proven reliable. Thus, they are mistrustful of informants who have indicated their unreliability, either by acknowledging their ignorance or by making obvious and easily identifiable mistakes. Indeed, 4-year-olds seem especially attuned to differences in 1 accuracy because when someone proves accurate they do not take that accuracy for granted but strengthen their trust in that person. What happens when these two strategies, the relational and the epistemic, are placed in conflict with one another? For example, how do preschoolers respond when they encounter a familiar informant who makes mistakes? They might ignore the mistakes and continue to invest selective trust in the familiar informant. Alternatively, they might attend to the mistakes and come to mistrust the informant despite his or her familiarity. Still, a third possibility is that there is an age change in the preschool period with younger children attending more to familiarity and older children to accuracy. To assess these three possibilities, extended the experiment described earlier involving two preschool caregivers, one familiar and one unfamiliar. The complete experiment had three phases: pretest trials, accuracy trials and post-test trials. As described earlier, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were shown unfamiliar objects in the pretest trials and given the opportunity to learn about them from the caregivers. Recall that children in all three age groups and in each childcare centre displayed a preference for the more familiar caregiver (Figs 12. 1 and 12. 2 ).
In the subsequent accuracy trials, children received information about the accuracy of the two caregivers. They were shown a set of familiar objects whose names they knew. Half the children heard the familiar caregiver name these objects accurately and the unfamiliar caregiver name them inaccurately. The remaining children heard the reverse arrangement: the familiar caregiver named them inaccurately whereas the unfamiliar caregiver named them accurately.
In post-test trials, children were shown four unfamiliar objects and were given Ask and Endorse probes akin to those in the pretest trials. Thus, we could check whether children's initial preference for the familiar caregiver was either strengthened or undermined depending on her behaviour in the accuracy trials. Fig. 12 . 10 shows the proportion of times that children continued to select the familiar informant after receiving information about her relative accuracy during the accuracy trials.
In the post-test trials, 5-year-olds were very sensitive to the information provided during the preceding accuracy trials. If the familiar informant had been accurate, they displayed a marked preference for her but if she had proven inaccurate, they switched, and displayed a preference for the hitherto unfamiliar -but accurate -informant. Four-year-olds also proved sensitive to the information provided during the accuracy trials. Like the 5-year-olds, they displayed a marked preference for the familiar informant if she had proven accurate but no systematic preference for her if she had proven inaccurate. Finally, the 3-year-olds were the least affected by accuracy information. Ignoring the feedback they had received in the accuracy trials, they maintained the preference for the familiar informant that they had displayed during the pretest trials. Clearly, this pattern of findings supports the third possibility: younger preschoolers attend more to familiarity and older preschoolers attend more to accuracy. But how can we explain the age change? Three possible explanations can be quickly ruled out. First, it might be argued that 3-year-olds did not notice the mistakes made by the unfamiliar informant during the accuracy trials. This is implausible because, as we saw earlier, in comparable experiments in which an unfamiliar informant made mistakes, 3-year-olds ended up mistrusting the person who made them (Pasquini et al. 2007 ; .
A variant on this explanation is similarly problematic. It could be argued that 4-year-olds, and certainly 5-year-olds, typically have an understanding of false belief. As argued earlier, they might be more appreciative than 3-year-olds of the fact that an informant has proven accurate. Hence, 4-and 5-year-olds might be more swayed by the information provided during accuracy trials, noting not just who is inaccurate but also who is accurate. Again, however, this argument overlooks the fact that 3-year-olds do differentiate between an accurate and an accurate informant when both are unfamiliar (Pasquini et al. 2007 ; .
Another possibility is that 3-year-olds weigh the few mistakes they have witnessed on the part of the familiar informant against a much longer history of interaction in which she has, presumably, proven accurate and they therefore discount those few errors. This line of explanation allows for the fact that 3-year-olds do differentiate between an accurate and an inaccurate informant when both are unfamiliar, and indeed are relatively unforgiving of a single error, but in the case of an unfamiliar informant, no prior history of interaction is available to serve as a counterweight to recent evidence of inaccuracy. However a similar argument would seem to apply just as forcefully to 4-and 5-year-olds. After all, they are likely to have had at least as long a history of interaction with the familiar informant as 3-year-olds. Yet despite their potentially deeper reservoir of accumulated trust, 4-and 5-year-olds did alter their pattern of trust in the wake of inaccuracy on the part of the familiar informant.
A more plausible explanation is that the findings reflect an important developmental shift in the relative weight that children attach to two different indices of trustworthiness: familiarity, or more broadly a feeling of social connection on the one hand and epistemic competence on the other. The data suggest that even though 3-year-olds can assess epistemic competence -they prefer accurate and knowledgeable informants to those who are inaccurate and ignorant -when asked to weigh that index of trustworthiness against familiarity, they attach more weight to social connection. The reverse is true for 5-year-olds. Other things being equal, they prefer to put their questions to, and accept information from, a familiar informant. However, when asked to weigh familiarity against epistemic competence -as indexed, for example, by accuracy -they prefer an unfamiliar but accurate informant to one who is familiar but inaccurate.
One concern about this line of explanation is that it could be regarded as a simple re-description of the findings. However, it is important to emphasize that, as formulated, the explanation goes beyond an account of the pattern of results depicted in Fig. 12 . 10 . The implication is that a variety of cues that might promote a sense of social connection will be increasingly trumped by epistemic competence in the course of the preschool years. For example, recent evidence shows that preschoolers prefer to learn from an informant who speaks with a native accent versus a foreign accent (Kinzler et al. 2010 ) . We assume that this preference is driven by feelings of social connectedness toward someone perceived as a member of the ingroup. As such, we anticipate that this preference would be relatively persistent among 3-year-olds. Thus, even if an informant with a native accent proved inaccurate, they would favour him or her over an informant with a 
Implications for metacognition
We have argued that young children use two different heuristics for selecting among informants. First, they prefer to learn from those who elicit feelings of social connectedness. Second, they prefer to learn from someone who displays epistemic competence by making well-informed claims. When these two heuristics are placed in conflict with one another, younger children -3-year-olds -favour social connectedness whereas older children -5-year-olds -favour epistemic competence.
We may now step back and consider the relationship between children's selective trust and the development of metacognition. We will consider whether children select among their informants by relying on either analytic metacognitive judgements or on metacognitive feelings (Koriat 2000 ; Proust 2007 ). At first sight, the developmental shift that we have described strongly suggests that children increasingly do make metacognitive evaluations in the sense that they appraise the epistemic standing of their informants. Still, this conclusion is open to doubt. Arguably, even though 4-and 5-year-olds choose among their informants in terms of relative accuracy it could be argued that they do so without any systematic recourse to metacognitive reflection. We will consider arguments for and against this conservative conclusion.
To the extent that children select among their informants in terms of social connectedness, one can plausibly argue that it is unnecessary to invoke any role for metacognition in that selection. On this sceptical argument, children give no thought to the possibility that those with whom they have a social connection offer more reliable or trustworthy information. Instead, they have an early and non-reflective bias to encode and retain information from their nearest and dearest. In much the same way, recent evidence suggests that non-human primates are biased to emulate models with greater prestige. Here too, it is plausible that such a bias is not guided by any consideration of the relative reliability of the information that high-ranking individuals provide as compared to low-ranking individuals. Admittedly, this is not to explain the origins of such a bias. Arguably, it is an innate bias that is built into social learning whether it is undertaken by children or by non-human primates. Alternatively, it is a by-product of information-processing biases that are likely to ensue from social preferences. For example, it is feasible that information delivered by a familiar attachment figure or by a high-ranking model is processed more extensively or deeply because such a source typically receives preferential attention. Still, even pending a fuller explanation of the basis for children's preference for information supplied by a familiar informant, it is unlikely that we need to infer any metacognitive basis for that selectivity.
However, it is worth discussing a possible caveat to this sceptical conclusion. Recall that when their mother and a stranger provided conflicting information, children's reactions varied in two ways. First, children's trust in their mother as compared to the stranger varied depending on the type of attachment that they had to her. But second, and more relevant to a potential role for metacognition, no matter what their attachment history, children were less prone to trust the claim provided by their mother when the hybrid creatures were asymmetric, i.e. in those cases when the categorization proposed by the mother was less consistent with the available perceptual evidence than the categorization proposed by the stranger. Recall that this was evident in the pattern of trust invested in the mother in Figs 12. 3 and 12. 4 as compared with the pattern in Fig. 12. 5 .
An initially plausible interpretation of this variation is that children engage in a metacognitive assessment of their level of confidence in the categorization that they themselves believe to (Smith 2009 ). Moreover, recent developmental studies have suggested that 3-year-olds also have an implicit access to their knowledge states (Balcomb and Gerken 2008 ) . Thus, children may have looked at the asymmetric squirrel-rabbit hybrid and judged themselves to be more confident of its being a squirrel than a rabbit. Hence, when their mother called it a rabbit but the stranger called it a squirrel, their differential confidence in those two categories inclined them to accept the stranger's proposal -at least more so than in cases when the mother's claim had been as consistent with the available perceptual evidence as the stranger's. However, it is also possible that children make no such metacognitive assessment of their feelings of confidence in a particular categorization or even if they are capable of such an assessment, make no use of it in weighing up the conflicting proposals. Instead, it is possible that two alternative categorizations -'squirrel' and 'rabbit' each come to mind but the strength or availability of those two representations differs. As a result, one representation is more susceptible to endorsement and retention than the other. Thus, when the mother and the stranger make conflicting proposals, the proposal that coincides with the stronger representation has a greater chance of survival, and of being adopted and endorsed by the child. On this admittedly cautious view, even if children were capable of stating their relative confidence in the two different categorizations ('I'm sure it's a rabbit -I doubt it's a squirrel'), it could still be the underlying strength or availability of the two representations that actually determines whether the mother or the stranger's claim is accepted. In sum, reviewing the evidence that was mustered in the first section, there is, for the time being anyway, no compelling reason to conclude that children's selective learning from particular informants implies that they engage in any metacognitive assessment of the relative trustworthiness of different informants or the relative plausibility of their own intuitions. Children do undoubtedly display selective trust but, for the time being, there is no firm evidence that it is guided by any metacognitive reflection on either the knowledge of their informants or their own knowledge.
We may now consider the evidence discussed in the second section. To the extent that children appraise informants in terms of the accuracy with which they have named familiar objects, does this imply some type of metacognitive reflection? At first sight, the evidence would seem to call for a positive answer. Recall that both 3-and 4-year-olds consistently preferred to learn from an informant who had proven more accurate in naming familiar objects. A plausible interpretation of this selectivity is that children judge that the hitherto more accurate informant is more knowledgeable. To that extent, such selective trust would imply a capacity for metacognition in the sense that children make judgements about the differential knowledge base of the two informants and accept information from the more knowledgeable informant -even if they give little thought to the mental processes by which an informant retrieves information from his or her knowledge base in answering a given question.
However, there are again reasons for caution. First, when the less accurate informant consistently misnames familiar objects, children may conclude, particularly when there is no obvious reason for the informant's errors, that the less accurate informant is simply deviant. Lucas and Lewis ( 2010 , p. 168) formulate this caution as follows: 'It may be that the expectation for correct labelling is so ingrained in young children that a violator is perhaps more likely to be viewed as globally incompetent or bizarre, rather than misinformed'. Hence, on this interpretation, children do not make a genuinely metacognitive appraisal of the less accurate informant. Instead, they make a more generic appraisal (she is 'globally incompetent'). Alternatively, they focus on her repeated deviation from a social norm (she is 'bizarre'). Both of these possibilities warrant consideration because preschool children are indeed prone to global attributions and they are also quite sensitive to deviations from social norms (Rakoczy et al. 2008 ) . Still, other evidence shows that neither of these two possibilities offers a satisfactory account of all the relevant findings on selective trust. Fusaro et al. (2011) presented preschoolers with two puppets, one who named familiar objects accurately and one who named them inaccurately. Children were then asked to make various predictions about each puppet. They predicted that the accurate puppet would be better at labelling objects but they anticipated no differences in other behavioural domains. Thus, they did not expect the two puppets to differ in terms of lifting objects, knowing what food particular animals eat, throwing basketballs into a hoop, or sharing cookies. Had children inferred that the inaccurate puppet was 'globally incompetent' they would presumably have expected him to do worse than the accurate puppet on the lifting, knowing and throwing tasks. Additionally, had children inferred that the inaccurate puppet was 'bizarre' -prone to deviate from social norms -they would presumably have expected him to share less than the accurate puppet. Indeed, in a control condition in which children were presented with two puppets who consistently differed in strength as indexed by their ability to lift four different containers, children did make global inferences: they predicted that the weaker puppet would be better not just at lifting but at labelling, knowing animal foods, throwing and sharing. In summary, these findings confirm the point that preschooler do indeed sometimes make global attributions of incompetence or non-conformity. Nonetheless, having observed two informants differ in accuracy, they make relatively narrow attributions. Lucas and Lewis ( 2010 ) advocate the use of two criteria for demonstrating that children's selective trust involves an assessment of the knowledge states of potential informants. First, they propose that children should be provided with reasons that would explain the differential accuracy of two informants. They point out for example, that in the film The Little Mermaid children are introduced to a character Ariel who lives under the sea and misnames the human artefacts that happen to come her way from shipwrecks. In such a case, children would be likely to view herappropriately enough -as lacking in a particular domain of knowledge rather than incompetent or socially deviant and to have a ready explanation for her ignorance, namely her non-human umwelt.
However, this criterion is overly stringent. Selective trust is likely to be especially useful if it is based on a metacognitive appraisal of informants' accuracy that is fast and frugal rather than probative. As adults, we readily make metacognitive inferences about people who differ in accuracy -namely that their differences in accuracy are due to differences in knowledge -even when we lack an explanation for the origin of those differences in knowledge. Similarly, when children encounter two informants who vary in accuracy, it is plausible that they attribute that variation to differences in knowledge, even when they are at a loss to explain how those differences in knowledge came about. Indeed, if children postponed mistrust in an inaccurate informant until they had an adequate explanation for the informant's inaccuracy, they might be vulnerable to all sorts of misinformation.
Consistent with this line of argument, when Koenig and Harris ( 2005 ) asked 3-and 4-year-olds to explain why one of the two informants had been inaccurate (i.e. was 'not good at answering questions') although over one-third were unable to supply an explanation, among those who did volunteer an explanation, the most frequently cited reason (12 out of 25 children) was speaker ignorance ('She didn't know the things' 'She doesn't know what they are'). Thus, even when children were given no background or life-history information that could explain the speaker's inaccuracy, ignorance was still the explanation that they favoured.
The second criterion proposed by Lucas and Lewis ( 2010 ) is a capacity for withholding trust in a selective fashion. More specifically, they propose that children be tested for their willingness to be 'forgiving' -to withhold negative assessments of an inaccurate informant in domains outside of the observed inaccuracy. Effectively, this means that children should be tested to check that 1 they make relatively, narrow, domain-specific attributions of lack of knowledge rather than global attributions of wide-ranging incompetence. As noted earlier, the findings of Fusaro et al. (2011) indicate that preschoolers do indeed make such narrow attributions. One final important point has been emphasized by Einav and Robinson ( 2011 ) . They underline the fact that accurate informants are not necessarily knowledgeable. They may be accurate only because they have just consulted someone else. Thus, when children infer that someone is knowledgeable on the basis of their accuracy, it would be appropriate for children to suppress that inference if there is evidence showing that the person's accuracy derives from a source other than that person's own knowledge. To examine this possibility, 4-year-olds were introduced to two puppets. One puppet named animals accurately without any help but the other named them accurately after receiving help from a third party. Subsequently, children were shown pictures of two unfamiliar animals and the puppets made conflicting claims about which animal was 'a tark'. Asked which puppet was right, children appropriately favoured the puppet whose prior accuracy was unaided.
Thus, the available evidence suggests that when children encounter two informants who differ in accuracy, they are prone to make a metacognitive inference -to conclude that the variation in accuracy reflects variation between the informants in their knowledge. Three pieces of evidence lend support to that conclusion. First, having observed that two potential informants differ in their accuracy, preschoolers expect local differences in knowledge rather than global differences in competence or social conformity. Second, when children are invited to explain those differences in accuracy they frequently and explicitly attribute them to differences in knowledge. Finally, their trust in a more accurate person is withdrawn if that person's accuracy appears to be based on help from a third party rather than their own knowledge base.
If we keep in mind the fact that 3-year-olds understand that knowing involves a certain causal relationship with a piece of information, and can monitor their own level of uncertainty (Sodian and Thoermer 2006 ) , we can better understand why, in the previously described situations, even younger children are not prone to indiscriminate credulity. Situations in which the source has been causally linked to the relevant information and children have no contradictory perceptual information are likely to induce their trust in claims made by the source. By contrast, indications that the causal link between the source and the information has been broken will tend to discredit claims from that source. Do these findings throw any light, however indirect, on children's understanding of the impact of informants on their own knowledge? For the time being, an agnostic answer is probably appropriate. It is certainly plausible that children seek knowledge in a selective fashion because they are aware of their own ignorance and recognize that one of the two informants can help reduce that ignorance. On the other hand, in virtually all of the experiments described in this chapter, children were prompted to ask one of the two informants and they were then invited to endorse one or the other of the claims that the two informants made. In future research, it will be important to study the conditions under which children seek knowledge from particular informants in a spontaneous fashion. We know from naturalistic studies of children's speech that they spontaneously ask many questions during the preschool period, especially when talking to a familiar caregiver (Chouinard 2007 ; Harris 2012 ). What we do not yet know is how far children understand that such information-seeking will reduce their ignorance, particularly if they put their questions to a knowledgeable informant.
Conclusions
Assuming that children do increasingly assess their informants not in terms of a social or emotional connection but in terms of a metacognitive appraisal of how knowledgeable they are, how 1 does such a shift come about? We may speculate about three different possibilities. First, in the course of development, children might draw up an increasingly detailed map of the way that knowledge is distributed. So long as they remain within their family circle, the limits to the knowledge of familiar adult caregivers may not be obvious. However, children may increasingly realize that their familiar caregivers are not fully conversant with every aspect of the wider world.
An informant who is a relative stranger may turn out to be a more knowledgeable source of information. More generally, as young children's social horizon expands, they are likely to observe that knowledge and skill are not universal -particular informants know about particular contexts (Keil et al. 2008 ) . On this hypothesis, children will be more or less slow to privilege epistemic competence over social connectedness depending on the breadth of their social experience. A second possibility is that the shift is intimately connected to conceptual changes in children's understanding of knowledge and belief during the preschool years. We have emphasized that children who fail classic measures of false belief understanding will still come to mistrust an inaccurate informant. Nevertheless, it is feasible that progress in understanding the risk of false beliefs prompts children to recognize that accuracy is not automatic and should not be taken for granted. Hence, those who are consistently or predominantly accurate should be regarded as trustworthy.
Finally, the shift may have a strong maturational component. In most human societies, children's social circle gradually widens beyond the family in the course of the preschool years. Arguably, nature has built into children's cultural learning an endogenous shift in the weights that they attach to various signals of trustworthiness. Thus, more or less independent of the breadth of their social horizon or indeed of their level of conceptual development, children may become increasingly prone to compare familiar caregivers to other less familiar informants in terms of their accuracy and more broadly in terms of their epistemic competence. 
